Long-term care and lazy rotten kids by Cremer, Helmuth & Roeder, Kerstin
Long-term care and lazy rotten kids1
Helmuth Cremer
Toulouse School of Economics
Kerstin Roeder
LMU, Munich
February 2013, revised August 2013
1Financial support from the Chaire Marché des risques et creation de valeur of the
FdR/SCOR is gratefully acknowledged. This paper has been presented at the European Health
Economics Workshop, the Public Economic Theory Conference, the Journées dEconomie Pub-
lique Louis-André Gérard-Varet and in seminars at the Universities of Munich, and Constance.
We thank all the participants for their comments. We are particularly grateful to Justina
Klimaviciute for her insightful remarks and suggestions.
Abstract
This paper studies the determination of informal long-term care (family aid) to de-
pendent elderly in a worst case scenario concerning the harmonyof family relations.
Children are purely selsh, and neither side can make credible commitments (which
rules out e¢ cient bargaining). The model is based on Beckers rotten kid specica-
tion except that it explicitly accounts for the sequence of decisions. In Beckers world,
with a single good, this setting yields e¢ ciency. We show that when family aid (and
long-term care services in general) are introduced the outcome is likely to be ine¢ cient.
Still, the rotten kid mechanism is at work and ensures that a positive level of aid is
provided as long as the bequest motive is operative. We identify the ine¢ ciencies by
comparing the laissez-faire (subgame perfect) equilibrium to the rst-best allocation.
We initially assume that families are identical ex ante. However, the case where dyn-
asties di¤er in wealth is also considered. We study how the provision of long-term care
(LTC) can be improved by public policies under various informational assumptions. In-
terestingly, crowding out of private aid by public LTC is not a problem in this setting.
With an operative bequest motive, public LTC will have no impact on private aid. More
amazingly still, when the bequest motive is (initially) not operative, public insurance
may even enhance the provision of informal aid.
Keywords: Rotten kids, long-term care, family aid, optimal taxation
JEL-Classi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1 Introduction
Long-term care (LTC) concerns people who depend on help to carry out daily activities
such as eating, bathing, dressing, going to bed, getting up or using the toilet (OECD,
2005). It is delivered informally by families  mainly spouses, daughters and step-
daughters and, to a lesser extent, formally by care assistants, who are paid under some
form of employment contract. Formal care is given at home or in an institution (such
as care centers and nursing homes). The governments of most industrialized countries
are involved in either the provision or nancing of LTC services, or often both, although
the extent and nature of their involvement di¤ers widely across countries.1
In the future, the demand for formal LTC services by the population is likely to
grow substantially. LTC needs start to rise exponentially from around the age of 80
years. The number of persons aged 80 years and above is growing faster than any other
segment of the population. As a consequence, the number of dependent elderly at the
European level (EU27) is expected to grow from about 21 million people in 2007 to
about 44 millions in 2060 (European Commission, 2009). We thus anticipate increasing
pressure on resources demanded to provide LTC services for the frail elderly, and this
pressure will be on the three institutions currently nancing and providing LTC services:
the state, the market and the family.
To assess the adequacy of LTC nancing and provision and to make projections, it
is important to assess he extent to which countries will be able in the future to rely
on the informal provision of care. Most seniors with impairments reside in their home
or that of their relatives, and they rely largely on volunteer care from family members.
These include seniors with severe impairments (unable to perform at least four activities
of daily living). An important feature that is often neglected is the real motivation for
family solidarity. For long, we have adopted the fairy tale view of children or spouses
helping their dependent parents with joy and dedication, what we call pure altruism. We
now increasingly realize that family solidarity is often based on forced altruism (social
norm) or on strategic considerations (e.g., Cox 1987; Cox and Rank, 1992; Canta and
Pestieau, 2013).2
1For a more in-depth discussion see the overview by Cremer, Pestieau and Ponthière (2012).
2Either way family care goes along with disutility and forgone labor market opportunities for the
care-giving person. See, for instance, Bolin, Lindgren and Lundborg, (2008); Hughes et al. (1999); and
Schulz and Beach, (1999).
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Knowing the foundation of altruism is very important to see how family assistance
will react to the emergence of private or public schemes of LTC insurance. For example,
the introduction of LTC social insurance is expected to crowd out family solidarity
based on pure altruism (e.g., Cremer, Gahvari and Pestieau, 2013). On the other hand,
where solidarityis based on strategic exchanges crowding out is expected to be less
signicant. Its precise extent, is then likely to depend on the specic way these inter-
family exchanges are determined. The existing literature (e.g., Bernheim, Shleifer, and
Summers, 1985) concentrates on strategic bequest type models with full commitment
leading to e¢ cient bargaining. In reality this appears to be a rather strong assumption.
In this paper, we study the determination of family aid in what can be considered
a worst case scenario as to the harmonyof family relations. Children act in a purely
selsh way and neither side can make credible commitments (which would open the
possibility of e¢ cient bargaining as in the strategic bequest setting). The model we use
is based on Beckers (1974; 1991) rotten kidspecication (see also Bergstrom, 1989;
1996) except that we explicitly account for the sequence of decisions (like Bruce and
Waldman, 1990). In Beckers world, with a single good, this setting yields an e¢ cient
outcome, even in the absence of commitment and when a child is purely selsh. We
show that when family aid (and LTC services in general) are introduced the outcome is
likely to be ine¢ cient. This is particularly true when the parents value their childrens
care more than the market substitutes.3 Still, the rotten kid mechanism is at work
and ensures that a positive level of aid is provided as long as the bequest motive is
operative. We study how the ine¢ ciency can be corrected by public policies under
various informational assumptions. For most of the paper, we assume that families are
identical ex ante. However, the case where dynasties di¤er in wealth is also considered.
The design of public policy has to account for the (in)e¢ ciencies of informal aid.
The conventional wisdom is that public policy often creates or at least enhances such
ine¢ ciencies through crowding out. In our setting, however, the relationship between
public LTC and family aid is more complex. As long as the bequest motive is operative,
the children do provide some informal aid to their parents, but its level is too low,
except when the full impact of aid is captured by its monetary valuation in the parents
3 It was already pointed out by Bergstrom (1989) that Beckers rotten kid theorem holds if there is
one commodity (money), the parent is an e¤ective altruist and chooses after the child (for this see also
Hirshleifer, 1977), and the model is static. For a summary of cases when the rotten kid theorem fails
see also Laferrère and Wol¤ (2006).
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utility. Childrens labor supply is then also ine¢ cient, but this problem is not directly
connected to the potential need for LTC. When the bequest motive is not operative, no
family aid will be provided and the case for public intervention will be even stronger.
Interestingly, this failure of family aid may e¤ectively be related to private market
ine¢ ciencies. Particularly, an individual who cannot a¤ord to buy insurance coverage
to cover the potential monetary cost of LTC may be subject to a double punishment.
In case of dependency the individual will not only run out of resources, but he can also
not count on any family aid (since he has no resources to leave a bequest). Public aid
may then even result in a positive bequest and thus bring about a positive level of aid.
To sum up, crowding out of private aid by public LTC is not a problem in this setting.
With an operative bequest motive, public LTC will have no impact on private aid. More
amazingly still, when the bequest motive is (initially) not operative, public insurance
may even enhance the provision of informal aid.
Public intervention in LTC is often advocated because it might help to overcome
ine¢ ciencies in the private insurance market.4 When, as is typically observed in reality,
private LTC insurance involves signicant loading costs (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007),
the laissez-faire solution implies insu¢ cient insurance. Public insurance may mitigate
this problem but once again its e¤ectiveness will hinge on the extent of crowding out
of family aid. For the sake of realism we consider the possibility that private insurance
may involve loading costs, but this is not the driving force behind our results.
Either way, the e¤ectiveness and the design of public LTC depend on the available
instruments which is ultimately of course a question of information. We rst study the
implementation of the rst-best (FB) under full information. Though of limited realism
this is an interesting benchmark to show which instruments are necessary within this
setting of multi-stage strategic interaction to achieve the e¢ cient solution. We show
that the FB can be decentralized by a lump-sum transfer from the dependent to the
healthy elderly supplemented by linear subsidies on labor incomes (of the young) and
aid. Lump sum transfers are determined to mimic fair private insurance. Next, we look
at a second-best solution which is achieved when aid is not observable (and thus cannot
not be subsidized). The set of instruments now consists of a lump-sum tax on the
healthy old and linear taxes on childs income that both nance public LTC provision
4See e.g. Siciliani (2013) for a discussion of the relative merits of public and private insurance.
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to dependent parents. We show that transfers are used to achieve full insurance of the
old. The tax on labor, on the other hand, is not used to raise revenue, but because
it increases informal aid (which becomes more attractive when market labor is taxed).
If possible the tax on childrens labor supply should be di¤erentiated according to the
dependency status of their parents. The level of the tax on the children of dependent
parents is then set to strike a balance between the deadweight loss of the labor tax
and the benets associated with its e¤ect on aid (a tax on labor e¤ectively acts like
a subsidy on aid). Children of healthy parents, on the other hand, benet from the
rst-best subsidy on labor.
Finally, we turn to a setting where individuals are heterogenous and parents di¤er
in wealth. This adds an extra potential justication for public intervention, namely
redistribution. It also makes a case where some individuals cannot a¤ord private LTC
coverage more plausible and we can have an initial equilibrium in which the bequest
motive is operative for some individuals and not for others. To concentrate on distribu-
tional issues, we assume that the government does not observe wealth, while all other
variables are observable. We consider a two-types setting and study the second-best
allocation achieved under this information structure. We show that bequests in rich
families are not distorted (neither taxed nor subsidized at the margin), but there is
a downward distortion on bequests in poor families. In other words, bequests left by
low wealth parents are subject to a positive marginal tax. This result is in line with
standard ndings in optimal tax models (Mirrlees, 1971). More surprisingly, the solu-
tion implies a rst-best tradeo¤ for labor supply and informal care. Interestingly, this
rst-best tradeo¤ does not imply the same marginal tax rates on labor or aid as in the
decentralization of the rst-best under full information. This is because the bequest
tax a¤ects also labor supply and aid decisions and the tax or subsidy rates have to be
adjusted accordingly. Finally, high wealth individuals are fully insured; the insurance
provision to the low wealth parents, on the other hand is distorted (and the sign of this
distortion does not appear to be unambiguous). Private insurance is su¢ cient when
markets are fair, but it will be replaced by public insurance (public LTC benets) when
there are loading costs.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the economic setup.
The rst-best allocation is described in Section 3 followed by the analysis of the laissez-
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faire allocation (subgame perfect equilibrium of the aid for bequestgame) in Section
4. Section 5 compares the two outcomes and shows how the rst-best allocation can
be decentralized. Second-best policies under di¤erent informational assumptions are
presented in Sections 6 and 7. The former determines the optimal policy instruments
when aid is not observable, while the latter for the case where families di¤er in (unob-
servable) wealth. Section 8 o¤ers some concluding remarks. More technical material,
including all proofs, is relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
Consider a population (which size is normalized to one) consisting of one parent (sub-
script p) and one child (subscript c) families. While the child is selsh, the parent is
a pure altruist. The parent is retired and has accumulated wealth !. He faces the prob-
ability  of becoming dependent and needing long-term care. The need of LTC requires
expenditures of amount L and comes along with a utility loss due to the deprivation of
autonomy captured by q  0. LTC insurance coverage can be bought on the private
market at a price p  . For p =  LTC insurance is actuarially fair. The parent
decides how much LTC insurance coverage I to buy and how much he wants to leave
as a bequest to his child. The child decides how much labor to supply and how much
informal care to provide. On the one hand, care provided by the child reduces the mon-
etary loss from LTC by h(a)  L (with h0 > 0; h00 < 0) since then the parent requires
less professional care services. On the other hand, it reduces the (utility) loss the parent
su¤ers from LTC implying q0(a)  0 (with q00 < 0). The latter reects the fact that
the parent prefers care by his child to care provided by a stranger or to entering a
nursing home. The child, earns income w`, where w denotes the childs wage rate and `
labor supply. Labor supply as well as informal care provision come along with disutility
captured by v, with v0 > 0; v00 > 0.
The altruistic parent maximizes the following welfare function
Wp = Up + Uc:
Individual utility of the parent Up is given by
Up =  [u(!   pI + I   L+ h(a)  b) + q(a)] + (1  )u(!   pI  bb);
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where a b indicates the state of staying healthy. Utility of the child is given by
Uc =  [u(w`+ b)  v(`+ a)] + (1  )
h
u(wb`+bb)  v(b`)i :
The utility function satises u0 > 0, u00 < 0 and u000  0.5
The timing of the model is as follows: rst the government announces its policy.
Then, the parent and the child play the following three stage game. In stage 1, the
parent decides how much LTC insurance coverage, I, to buy. In stage 2, the state of
nature is revealed, that is, the parent is either disabled or not. Then, the child decides
how much labor to supply, ` and b`, and how much informal care, a, to provide if the
parent is dependent. Finally, in stage 3 the parent decides the level of bequests, b;bb  0,
in each state of nature. To determine the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium we solve
this game by backward induction. But, before we turn our attention to the laissez-faire
we study the rst-best allocation which provides a benchmark against which we can
compare the laissez-faire allocation.
3 First-best solution
With ex ante identical families, we can dene the optimal allocation as the one max-
imizing the expected utility of a representative dynasty. This problem can be written
as
max
`;b`;a;mp;mc;bmp;bmc W
fb =  [u(mp) + q(a) + u(mc)  v(`+ a)]
+ (1  )
h
u(bmp) + u(bmc)  v(b`)i
s.t. ! + (1  )w`+ 
h
wb`+ h(a)i = [mp +mc + L] + (1  ) [bmp + bmc] ;
(1)
where the decision variables are labor supplies, ` and b`, informal care, a, and consump-
tion levels of the parent and the child in both states of nature. We denote the latter by
mp, mc, bmp and bmc. In the rst-best all variables are directly set, assuming full inform-
ation and disregarding the multi-stage structure of the game. However, the specication
of the game will of course be relevant below when we study the decentralization of the
rst-best optimum. Denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource con-
straint (1) by , the rst order conditions (FOCs) characterizing the optimal solution
5The assumption on the third derivative is not essential for our analysis. It is used for a single result;
see Subsection 7.2.
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can be written as follows
u0(mfbp ) = u
0(mfbc ) = u
0(bmfbp ) = u0(bmfbc ) = ; (2)
v0(b`fb)
u0(bmfbc ) = w; (3)
v0(`fb + afb)
u0(mfbc )
= w; (4)
h0(afb) +
q0(afb)
u0(mfbc )
= w: (5)
These expressions are pretty much self-explanatory. Equation (2) states the equality
of marginal utilities of incomes across individuals and states of nature (full insurance).
Equations (3) and (4) are the usual conditions describing the e¢ cient choice of labor
supply. For informal care we obtain a similar condition, except that this variable involves
both monetary benets, h0(a), and utility gains, q0(a), which translates into the marginal
rate of substitution term on the LHS of equation (5).
4 Laissez-faire allocation
4.1 Stage 3: optimal bequests
The parent is either healthy or dependent. In both states of nature he observes the
childs labor income and informal care provision (in case he requires LTC). The parent
chooses his optimal bequests by maximizing welfare; equation (6) when he is healthy
and equation (7) when he requires LTC:
maxbb cWp =u(!   pI  bb) + u(wb`+bb)  v(b`); (6)
max
b
Wp =u(! + (1  p)I   L+ h(a)  b) + q(a) + u(w`+ b)  v(`+ a): (7)
Assuming an interior solution, the optimal bequests in each state of nature are implicitly
given by
@cWp
@bb =  u0(bmp) + u0(bmc) = 0; (8)
@Wp
@b
=  u0(mp) + u0(mc) = 0: (9)
That is, bequests are chosen so that consumption levels between the parent and the child
are equal in both states of nature. Recall that bequests are restricted to be nonnegative,
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and one obtains from (8) and (9)
bb > 0 () !   pI > wb`;
b > 0 () ! + (1  p)I   L+ h(a) > w`:
In words, the net resources of the parents (including LTC cost and the monetary value
of informal aid, if any) must be larger than that of the children, otherwise the bequest
motive is not operative.
Let bb  bb(I; b`) and b  b(I; `; a) denote the optimal bequest levels. When the solu-
tion is interior, the derivatives with respect to LTC insurance coverage, labor supplies
and informal care are as follows
@b
@a
=
u00(mp)h0(a)
u00(mp) + u00(mc)
=
h0(a)
2
; (10)
@b
@`
=
 u00(mc)w
u00(mp) + u00(mc)
=  w
2
 @
bb
@ b` ; (11)
@b
@I
=
(1  p)u00(mp)
u00(mp) + u00(mc)
=
1  p
2
;
@bb
@I
=  p
2
: (12)
When the child increases his LTC provision the parent increases his bequest by half of
the additional return. On the other hand, if the child increases his labor supply and
thereby his income, then half of this additional income is taxed away by a reduction in
the parents bequest. The net return (when dependent) and the costs (when healthy)
of additional LTC insurance coverage are equally divided between the parent and the
child.
4.2 Stage 2: optimal labor supply and informal care provision
The child takes into account the bequest he gets from the parent and chooses labor
supply and informal care by maximizing
maxb` bUc =u(wb`+bb(I; b`))  v(b`); (13)
max
`;a
Uc =u(w`+ b(I; `; a))  v(`+ a): (14)
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The FOCs with respect to b`, ` and a are given by
@ bUc
@ b` = u0(bmc)
 
w +
@bb
@ b`
!
  v0(b`) = 0; (15)
@Uc
@`
= u0(mc)

w +
@b
@`

  v0(`+ a) = 0; (16)
@Uc
@a
= u0(mc)
@b
@a
  v0(`+ a) = 0: (17)
Equations (15) and (16) show that the anticipation of a positive bequest reduces the
childs marginal benets of labor supply and the rotten kid becomes the lazy rotten
kid. This is because the parent lowers the bequest as childs income increases. In other
words, part of the childs extra revenue is taxed awayby the parents. Equation (17)
implies that without a bequest, it is never optimal for the selsh child to provide LTC.
If the bequest motive is operative (b is determined by an interior solution) then the
amount bequeathed increases with informal care provision since informal care reduces
the monetary costs of LTC; see equation (10).
For an operative bequest motive equations (10) to (12) imply
h0(a) =w; (18)
u0(mc)
w
2
=v0(`+ a); (19)
u0(bmc)w
2
=v0(b`): (20)
These expressions implicitly determine labor supply in both states of nature, as functions
of I (set in the previous stage of the game): `  `(I) and b`  b`(I). Equation (18)
species informal care a which is independent of LTC insurance coverage. Since the
child acts in a completely selsh way when determining his informal care provision, he
only takes into consideration its e¤ect on bequests. Both informal care and labor cause
the same disutility. So in the optimum the child equalizes their returns. Recall that
@b=@a = h0(a)=2 which means that the child will receive half of the monetary value
his aid represents to the parent. However, since wage income is also taxed awayat
50% the tradeo¤ represented by equation (18) is e¤ectively the e¢ cient one as far the
monetary value of aid is concerned. The non-monetary value of aid (that arises when
q0(a) > 0) is not taken into account because it does not translate into a higher bequest.
Consequently, informal aid is e¢ cient when q0(a) = 0; otherwise it is too low because
the utility benets, q0(a)=u0(mp), valued by parents are not accounted for.
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The comparative statics of labor supply with respect to I (under an operative be-
quest motive) are given by
@`
@I
=
 u00(mc)
 
w + @b

@`

@b
@I
u00(mc)
 
w + @b

@`
2   v00(`+ a) =  u
00(mc)(1  p)w
u00(mc)w2   4v00(`+ a) < 0; (21)
@ b`
@I
=
 u00(bmc)w + @bb
@ b`

@bb
@I
u00(bmc)w + @bb
@ b`
2   v00(b`) =
u00(bmc)pw
u00(bmc)w2   4v00(b`) > 0: (22)
Since LTC insurance is a net benet for the parent in the state of dependency it increases
the parents bequest and thereby reduces labor supply incentives of the child. In the
state of being healthy, by contrast, LTC insurance is only a cost which in turn reduces
the bequest and the child becomes less lazy.
Finally, when the bequest motive is not operative, we obtain
a =0; (23)
u0(mc)w =v0(`+ a); (24)
u0(bmc)w =v0(b`): (25)
In words, with no bequests there is no aid, but labor supply decisions are e¢ cient (since
there is no implicit tax anymore). Interestingly, once the bequest motive becomes
operative, the actual level of the bequest is of relevance for the level of labor supply but
not for the level of family aid; see equation (18).
4.3 Stage 1: optimal LTC insurance coverage
We now turn to the rst stage in which the parent chooses LTC insurance coverage I
to maximize the following welfare function
max
I
Wp = [u(! + (1  p)I   L+ h(a)  b) + q(a) + u(w` + b)  v(` + a)]
+ (1  )
h
u

!   pI  bb+ uwb` +bb  v b`i : (26)
In this function a, b, `, bb and b` are determined at the equilibrium of the subsequent
stages which, as described in the previous subsections, is contingent on the level of I
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set in the rst stage. The FOC of (26) with respect to I is given by
@Wp
@I
= u0(mp)

1  p  @b

@I
  @b

@`
@`
@I

+ (1  )u0(bmp)  p  @bb
@I
  @
bb
@ b` @ b`

@I
!
+ 

u0(mc)

w
@`
@I
+
@b
@I
+
@b
@`
@`
@I

  v0(` + a)@`

@I

+ (1  )
"
u0(bmc) w@ b`
@I
+
@bb
@I
+
@bb
@ b` @ b`

@I
!
  v0(b`)@ b`
@I
#
: (27)
With the envelope theorem, this expression reduces to
@Wp
@I
= u0(mp)

1  p  @b

@`
@`
@I

  (1  )u0(bmp) p+ @bb
@ b` @ b`

@I
!
= 0
, u
0(mp)
u0(bmp) =
(1  )

p+ @
bb
@ b` @ b`@I


 
1  p  @b@` @`

@I
 : (28)
Interestingly, equation (28) implies full insurance (mp = bmp) when private insurance is
fair ( = p). To see this observe that under full insurance (19)(20) yield ` + a = b`.
It then follows immediately from (11)(12) together with (21)(22) that full insurance
is a solution to equation (28). This result is not particularly surprising; obtaining
full insurance in a fair market is a rather common result (see Mossin, 1968). On the
other hand, in our setting it is not obvious at rst glance because of the multi-stage
nature of the game. Full insurance is only optimal (and for that matter feasible) when
the symmetry between states of nature sought in the rst stage is not destroyed by
the subsequent strategic interactions. This happens to be the case in our setting in
particular because total labor supply (market labor plus aid) will be the same in both
states of nature.
When  < p, we obtain mp < bmp implying less than full insurance. To see this
we take equation (28) and evaluate it at full insurance, that is, I is chosen so that
u0(bmp) = u0(mp)
@Wp
@I

u0(mp)=u0(bmp) = (   p)u0(mp)

1  u
00(mc)w2
2u00(mc)w2   8v00(`+ a)

< 0;
which is negative since the rst term in brackets is negative for  < p and the second
term in brackets is positive. In other words, a marginal reduction in I, from its full
insurance level increases welfare. Consequently, the parents optimal choice involves
lower than full insurance.6
6As long as Wp is a concave function of I (and given that in stage 1, the parents problem is single
dimensional).
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5 Laissez-faire versus rst-best allocation
The following proposition summarizes the main results of Sections 3 and 4 and specic-
ally compares the laissez-faire equilibrium to the rst-best allocation.7
Proposition 1 The laissez-faire solution (subgame perfect equilibrium) of the three
stage game with altruistic parents and selsh children has the following properties:
(i) when private insurance is fair,  = p, there is full insurance, mp = bmp; otherwise
insurance is less than full, mp < bmp.
(ii) when the bequest motive is operative (so that b;bb > 0):
(a) we have a > 0 and dened by h0(a) = w. Consequently, informal aid is
e¢ cient when q0(a) = 0; otherwise it is too low because the utility benets, q0(a)=u0(mp),
valued by parents are not accounted for.
(b) childrens market labor supply in both states of nature is ine¢ cient; there
is a downward distortion because children face an implicit tax of 50% on their labor
income (via a reduction in bequests).
(iii) when the bequest motive is not operative (so that b = bb = 0):
(a) we have a = 0; no informal aid is provided. Consequently, aid provision
is always ine¢ cient.
(b) childrens market labor supply decision is e¢ cient in both states of nature;
they no longer face any implicit tax on their labor incomes.
5.1 The case for public LTC policy
The results summarized in Proposition 1 provide us with a basis on which we can build
to assess the opportunity and the design of public LTC policy. The rst item suggests
that public intervention is useful to overcome ine¢ ciencies in the private insurance
market. When, as is typically observed in reality, p >  the laissez-faire solution
implies insu¢ cient insurance.
Though interesting and realistic, this is not at the heart of our analysis. Our focus
will be on the interaction between public policy and family aid. As long as the bequest
motive is operative the children do provide some informal aid to their parents, however,
its level is too low except when q0(a) = 0 (so that the full impact of aid is captured
7The comparison follows directly from expression (18)(20), (23)(25) and (2)(3).
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by its monetary valuation in the parents utility). Childrens labor supply is then
also ine¢ cient, but this problem is not directly connected to the potential need for
LTC. When the bequest motive is not operative no family aid will be provided and
the case for public intervention will be even stronger. Strikingly, this failure of family
aid may e¤ectively be related to private market ine¢ ciencies. To see this assume that
pL > ! > L. In that case the individual cannot a¤ord to buy insurance coverage to
cover the potential monetary costs of LTC. In case of dependency, the individual will
then not only run out of resources, but he can also not count on any family aid (since
he has no resources to leave a bequest). However, as long as ! > L the individual
can a¤ord insurance coverage at a fair rate. Interestingly, this may even result in a
positive bequest and thus bring about a positive level of aid. To sum up, crowding
out of private aid by public LTC is not a problem in this setting. With an operative
bequest motive, public LTC will have no impact on private aid. More amazingly, when
the bequest motive is (initially) not operative, public LTC insurance may even enhance
the provision of informal aid.
Either way, the e¤ectiveness and the design of public LTC depend on the available
instruments which are ultimately of course a question of information. In the next section
we rst study the implementation of the FB under full information. Though of limited
realism this is an interesting benchmark to show which instruments are necessary within
this setting of multi-stage strategic interactions to obtain the e¢ cient solution. Next,
we look at a second-best solution which is achieved when aid is not observable (and thus
cannot be subsidized). Finally, we turn to a setting where individuals are heterogenous
and dynasties di¤er in wealth. This adds an extra potential justication for public
intervention, namely redistribution. It also makes the case where some individuals
cannot a¤ord private LTC coverage more plausible and we can have an initial equilibrium
in which the bequest motive is operative for some individuals and not for others.
5.2 Decentralization of the rst-best allocation
Assume for the time being that there is no asymmetry of information so that all relev-
ant variables including informal aid are publicly observable. The following proposition
(which is established in the Appendix 2) shows how this FB allocation within our
multi-stage setting can be decentralized by a lump-sum transfer from the healthy to the
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dependent elderly ( bD;D) supplemented by linear subsidies on labor incomes (by; y)
and aid (a).
Proposition 2 Under full information, the FB allocation can be decentralized by a
lump-sum transfer from the dependent to the healthy elderly supplemented by linear
subsidies on labor incomes (of the young) and aid. To achieve this, the instruments are
set at the following levels:
(i) the rates of subsidies on w` and wb` denoted y and by are given by
y = by = 1 (29)
(ii) informal care is subsidized at rate a given by
a = h
0(afb) + 2
q0(afb)
u0(mfbc )
(30)
(iii) the lump-sum transfer to dependent elderly, D, and the lump-sum tax imposed
on the healthy elderly, bD, are given by
D =(1  )
h
L  h(afb)
i
  aafb   yw`fb; (31)bD = hL  h(afb)i+ bywb`fb: (32)
The intuition behind these conditions is as follows. Condition (29) is the most
straightforward: since the children face a 50% implicit tax on their labor incomes (via
the reduction in bequests), we have to subsidize them at rate 1. In other words, the
total income is multiplied by 2 of which the children receive half so that we get the
correct tradeo¤. Expression (30) is also quite intuitive, except that the factor 2 may
appear to be surprising at rst. The sole benet children get from a is h0(a)=2; see
equation (10). Consequently, the remaining social benets, namely
h0(afb)
2
+
q0(afb)
u0(mfbc )
;
are not taken into account. This can be compensated by a subsidy. However since half
of the subsidy will be lost due to the reduction in bequests, a must be set at a level of
twice the unaccounted social benets, which yields (30).
Turning to D and bD, the dependent old get the monetary loss of dependency (which
is exactly the net benet a fair private insurance would give) less the subsidies to
their children. In sum, since parents nance the subsidies to their own children, these
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payments do not involve any transfers between families (that is across states of nature).
Such transfers are not necessary because the lump sum transfers between the elderly
are already designed to achieve full insurance.
This rst-best decentralization provides an interesting benchmark. However, in real-
ity some of the relevant variables are likely not to be publicly observable which, in turn,
will restrict the available policy instruments. We shall now study the policy design in
second-best settings where information is no longer complete. We start by a setting in
which informal aid is not observable so that it cannot be subsidized.
6 Second-best: unobservable aid
Assume the government employs a lump-sum tax on the healthy old, bD and taxes childs
income at a proportional rate t when parents are dependent and at a rate bt when they
are healthy to nance public LTC provision, D to dependent parents.8 The optimization
problem is then characterized by
max
t;bt;D; bD W (t;bt;D; bD) = [u(! + (1  p)I +D   L+ h(a)  b) + q(a)]
+  [u((1  t)w` + b)  v(` + a)]
+ (1  )
h
u(!   pI   bD  bb) + u(1  bt)wb` +bb  v b`i
s.t. tw` + (1  )btwb` + (1  ) bD = D: (33)
The FOCs of the above problem with respect to t, bt, D and bD are given by
@L
@t
=u0(mp)

h0(a)
@a
@t
  @b

@`
@`
@t
  @b

@a
@a
@t

+ q0(a)
@a
@t
  u0(mc)w` + 

w` + tw
@`
@t

= 0; (34)
@L
@bt =  u0(bmp)@bb@ b` @ b`

@bt   u0(bmc)wb` + 
 
wb` + btw@ b`
@t
!
= 0; (35)
@L
@D
=u0(mp)

1  @b

@`
@`
@D

  

1  tw@`

@D

= 0; (36)
@L
@ bD =  u0(bmp)
 
1 +
@bb
@ b` @ b`

@ bD
!
+ 
 
1 + btw@ b`
@ bD
!
= 0: (37)
8A change in the distribution of income between families does not alter their consumption as long
as the parent is an e¤ective altruist. In other words, whether the lump sum transfer is payed by the
children or by the parent is irrelevant. This neutrality property is the basis of the Ricardian equivalence
(see Barro, 1974).
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Appendix B shows that rearranging and combining these FOCs and dening the com-
pensated e¤ects as follows9
@`c
@t
=
@`
@t
+ w`
@`
@D
; (38)
@ b`c
@bt = @ b`@bt   wb`@ b`@ bD; (39)
yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume that informal aid, a, is not observable and that policy instru-
ments are restricted to public LTC provision to dependent parents, D, nanced by a
lump-sum tax on the healthy old, bD, and a linear tax on the childrens labor income at
rates t and bt. The optimal policy is characterized by:
(i) u0(bmp) = u0(mp): the transfers are used to achieve full insurance which (for an
operative bequest motive) also implies full insurance for the children, u0(bmc) = u0(mc).
(ii) the following optimal tax rates in the dependent and healthy state
t =
h
h0(a) + q
0(a)
u0(mp)
i
@a
@t  

@b
@`
@`c
@t +
@b
@a
@a
@t

 w @`c@t
; (40)
bt =  1: (41)
To explain these results let us rst interpret the expression for t; equation (40). The
numerator can be interpreted as Pigouvian terms. The rst one is a direct e¤ect which
resembles the Pigouvian expression derived in the previous section. The child does not
consider the positive externality of informal care provision on the parents utility. This
calls for a positive income tax which is e¤ectively a subsidy on aid. However, the labor
and aid variations induced by the tax also have indirect e¤ects on the parents utility.
These e¤ects are negative and operate via the adjustment in bequests. Both more
aid and lower labor supply increase bequests and thus reduce parents utility, which
counteracts the rst positive e¤ect of higher income taxes. The denominator represents
the deadweight loss of income taxation. Finally, the optimal tax rate in the healthy
state, bt, simply reects the rst-best subsidy on labor which is equal to one.
To sum up, transfers are used to achieve full insurance of the old. The tax on labor,
on the other hand, is not used to raise revenue but because it increases informal aid
9The sign of the last term changes because one is a transfer and the other a tax, so the compensation
(to remain at the same utility level) goes in opposite directions. We expect these compensated e¤ects
to be negative.
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(which becomes more attractive when market labor is taxed). The level of t is then
set to strike a balance between the deadweight loss of the labor tax (the denominator
of (40)) against the net benets associated with its e¤ect on aid (which arise provided
that the direct e¤ects in the numerator (40) dominate the negative ones), while bt is at
its rst-best level.
7 Heterogenous families
So far, families were identical. In this section we introduce parents who di¤er in their
wealth !i (i = l; h) where !l < !h. This brings in another important justication
for government intervention, namely redistribution. It also makes the case where some
parents cannot a¤ord private LTC coverage more plausible, and we can have an initial
equilibrium in which the bequest motive is operative for some families and not for others.
The share of type-i families is given by i. We assume that !i is unobservable to the
government. To concentrate on the implications of wealth heterogeneity we assume that
all other variables, that is, bequests (bi;bbi), labor supplies (`i; b`i), informal care ai and
LTC care insurance coverage Ii can be observed. The childrens consumption levels are
thus e¤ectively known by the government. Under the considered information structure
instruments include a (possibly nonlinear) transfer scheme for parents and children in
each state of nature given by D(Ii; bi), bD(Ii;bbi) and T (w`i; ai), bT (wb`i) respectively. In
other words, long-term care insurance coverage, bequests, labor supply and aid can be
taxed or subsidized and Di; bDi and Ti; bTi can be positive or negative.
With wealth heterogeneity, the (utilitarian) rst-best allocation continues to be
dened by expressions (2)(5) which apply for all types. The full information im-
plementation of the rst-best allocation remains as described in Proposition 2 except
that the transfers D and bD are now type specic and designed to eliminate wealth
di¤erences.10 Consequently, they imply a transfer from high- to low-wealth families.
In a second-best world with unobservable wealth and a utilitarian welfare function, the
incentive constraint from type-h to type-l families will then be binding.
We proceed as follows: rst, we reconsider the various states of the aid for bequest
game with nonlinear taxes and transfers and in particular parents and childs optimiza-
10All the other expressions in the proposition continue to apply and the taxes and subsidies on `, b`
and a are the same for all types.
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tion. Then, we determine the second-best allocation and show how the transfer scheme
must be designed to implement this allocation.
7.1 Equilibrium with nonlinear taxes and transfers
Given the above described transfer scheme, parents and childs utilities are given by11
W ip = [u(!i + (1  p)Ii   L+ h(ai)  bi +D(Ii; bi)) + q(ai)]
+ (1  )u

!i   pIi  bbi + bD(Ii;bbi)+ U ic; (42)
U ic = [u(w`i + bi + T (w`i; ai))  v (`i + ai)]
+ (1  )
h
u

wb`i +bbi + bT (wb`i)  v b`ii : (43)
In stage 3 parents maximize (42) with respect to bequests in both states of nature, b
and bb, which are then implicitly given by
u0(mip)
u0(mic)
=
1
1 Dib
; (44)
u0(bmip)
u0(bmic) = 11  bDibb : (45)
Dib and D
ibb denote partial derivatives which represent marginal tax (or subsidy) rates on
bequests. When bequests are taxed (subsidized) Dib; D
ibb < (>)0, parents have a higher
(lower) level of consumption than their children. From the above equations we can
calculate the following comparative statics
@bi
@ai
=
(1 Dib)u00(mip)h0(ai)  u00(mic)T ia
u00(mic) + (1 Dib)u00(mip)
; (46)
@bi
@`i
=
 u00(mic)(1 + T i` )w
u00(mic) + (1 Dib)u00(mip)
; (47)
@bbi
@ b`i =
 u00(bmic)(1 + bT ib`)w
u00(bmic) + (1  bDibb)u00(bmip) : (48)
In the second stage the children choose labor supplies, `i and b`i, and informal care
provision, ai, again taking into consideration their e¤ects on bequests. The marginal
11Type indices are generally subscripts but they become superscripts when either the subscript is
already used to indicate the family member, i.e. the child or the parent, or when the subscript is
already used for a partial derivative. This is simply to avoid multiple subscripts.
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rates of substitution are as follows
v0(`i + ai)
u0(mic)
= (1 + T i` )w +
@bi
@`i
=
"
1  u
00(mic)
u00(mic) + (1 Dib)u00(mip)
#
(1 + T i` )w; (49)
v0(`i + ai)
u0(mic)
= T ia +
@bi
@ai
= T ia +
(1 Dib)u00(mip)h0(ai)  u00(mic)T ia
u00(mic) + (1 Dib)u00(mip)
; (50)
v0(b`i)
u0(bmic) = (1 + bT ib`)w + @
bbi
@ b`i =
"
1  u
00(bmic)
u00(bmic) + (1  bDibb)u00(bmip)
#
(1  bT ib`)w: (51)
In the rst stage, parents choose their private insurance protection, I. However,
since we show below that private insurance is not necessary to implement the second-
best allocation, we do not reconsider the private insurance decision at this point.
7.2 Second-best solution
7.2.1 The problem
This subsection characterizes the optimal utilitarian allocation constrained by the in-
formation structure just sketched. The optimization problem of the government is given
by12
max
Ii;Di;bi;ai;`i;Ti; bDi;bbi;b`i;bTi W =
X
i2fl;hg
i

 [u(w`i + bi + Ti)  v(`i + ai)]
+  [u(!i + (1  p)Ii +Di   L+ h(ai)  bi) + q(ai)]
+ (1  )
h
u

!i + bDi   pIi  bbi+ uwb`i +bbi + bTi  v(b`i)i
subject to the resource constraintX
i2fl;hg
i
n
[Di + Ti] + (1  )
h bDi + bTiio = 0
and subject to the following incentive constraints for i; j 2 fl; hg
 [u(!i + (1  p)Ii +Di   L+ h(ai)  bi) + q(ai) + u(w`i + bi + Ti)  v(`i + ai)]
+ (1  )
h
u

!i + bDi   pIi  bbi+ uwb`i +bbi + bTi  v(b`i)i 
 [u(!i + (1  p)Ij +Dj   L+ h(aj)  bj) + q(aj) + u(w`j + bj + Tj)  v (`j + aj)]
+ (1  )
h
u

!i + bDj   pIj  bbj+ uwb`j +bbj + bTj  v b`ji 8 i 6= j: (52)
This problem characterizes the best allocation (in terms of utilitarian welfare) that
can be achieved given the information structure. Observe that since all children have
12We assume that the solution implies a strictly positive level of aid and thus an operative bequest
motive for all types.
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the same wage rate their labor supplies, ` and b`, are e¤ectively observable so that the
children of the mimicking parents must have the same labor supplies (and level of a) as
those of the mimicked parents; this explains the writing of the incentive constraint. As
usual in models with discrete types (and particularly with only two types) the solution
can be implemented in many ways.13 In the remainder of this section we shall look
at the implementation which interferes as little as possible with the structure of our
multi-stage aid for bequestgame. In other words, we will set the marginal tax rates
(whenever possible) so that both children and parents choose the optimal allocation as
interior solution of their optimization problem in the relevant stage of the game. We
shall rst examine the taxation of bequest, and then turn to the labor supply and aid
decisions and determine if and how they are distorted and whether they are subject to
taxation or subsidization. Finally, we consider private insurance as well as the lump-
sum transfers (or taxes) between the elderly (D and bD) which can be seen as public
LTC insurance (or benets) scheme.
Denote ij , i; j 2 fl; hg, the Lagrange multiplier associated with the self-selection
constraint from type-i to type-j families and  the one associated with the resource
constraint. The FOCs of this problem are stated in Appendix C. While our formal
conditions make no assumption as to the binding incentive constraint, our interpreta-
tions below will concentrate on the case where only the downward incentive constraint
is binding (hl > 0 and lh = 0). This is the relevant case with a utilitarian social
welfare function (which implies redistribution from the high-wealth to the low-wealth
individuals).
7.2.2 Taxation of bequests
Rearranging the FOCs with respect to bi and bbi yields the following marginal rates of
substitution between parents and childs utility
u0(mip)
u0(mic)
=
i + ij   ji u
0(mjic )
u0(mic)

1  u0(m
ji
p )
u0(mjic )

i + ij
8 i; (53)
u0(bmip)
u0(bmic) =
i + ij   ji u
0(bmjic )
u0(bmic)

1  u0(bmjip )
u0(bmjic )

i + ij
8 i: (54)
13And the nonlinear functions considered above can simply be used to control quantities by assigning
large penalties to any choices di¤erent from the optimal allocation. Though extreme, this shows that
implementation is always possible.
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Consider the topfamily, that is, the high-wealth family who is not mimicked implying
lh = 0. For such a family equations (53) and (54) are equal to one. In other words, rich
familiesbequests are not taxed at the margin which is the traditional no distortion at
the topresult. With (44) and (45) we thus have Dhb = bDhbb = 0. Low-wealth families,
by contrast, are those who are mimicked by high-wealth families implying hl > 0.
Since the childs consumption level is e¤ectively observed, we have u0(mjic ) = u0(mic)
and u0(bmjic ) = u0(bmic). Rich families who mimic poor families, however, no longer
equalize consumption levels between parents and children, but u0(mjip ) < u0(mjic ) and
u0(bmjip ) < u0(bmjic ) due to the parentshigher wealth. With (44) and (45), we have
1
1 Dlb
=
l   hl
h
1  u0(mhlp )
u0(mhlc )
i
l
< 1; (55)
1
1  bDlbb =
l   hl
h
1  u0(bmhlp )
u0(bmhlc )
i
l
< 1; (56)
implying Dlb; bDlbb < 0. In other words, poor families face a downward distortion on their
bequests. A tax on their bequests relaxes a binding incentive constraint; since type-h
families want to bequeath more to their children due to their higher wealth, they are
also hurt more by a tax on these transfers.
7.2.3 Taxation of childrens labor supply and aid
Rearranging the FOCs with respect to `i and b`i, we get the following marginal rates of
substitution for labor supply in the the dependent and the healthy state respectively
v0(`i + ai)
u0(mic)
=
h
i + ij   ji u
0(mjic )
u0(mic)
i
w
i + ij   ji
= w 8 i; (57)
v0(b`i)
u0(bmic) =
h
i + ij   ji u
0(bmjic )
u0(bmic)
i
w
i + ij   ji
= w 8 i: (58)
Since consumption levels of the children are e¤ectively observed in both states of nature,
the tradeo¤ that both rich and poor families face in the second-best is the same as in
the rst-best; see equations (3) and (4). Given the multi-stage nature of our problem
this however does not imply a marginal tax rate equal to zero. Combining equation
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(49) with (57) and equation (51) with (58), we obtain
(1 + T i` )w +
@bi
@`i
=
"
1  u
00(mic)
u00(mic) + (1 Dib)u00(mip)
#
(1 + T i` )w = w 8 i; (59)

1 + bT ib`w + @bbi
@ b`i =
"
1  u
00(bmic)
u00(bmic) + (1  bDibb)u00(bmip)
#
(1  bT ib`)w = w 8 i: (60)
That is, the tax on labor is chosen to o¤set the downward distortion of bequests on
labor supply. Solving equations (59) and (60) for T i` and bT ib` yields
T i` =
u00(mic)
(1 Dib)u00(mip)
8 i; (61)
T ib` = u00(bmic)(1 Dibb)u00(bmip) 8 i: (62)
Since the rich face no distortion on bequests (Dhb = D
hbb = 0 so that u00(mhc ) = u00(mhp)
and u00(bmhc ) = u00(bmhp)) these expressions imply the rst-best marginal tax (subsidy)
rates on labor supply: T h` = bT hb` = 1 (see Proposition 2). For the poor, by contrast, we
have a positive tax rate on bequests, and with our assumptions on utility this implies
u00(mlp)  u00(mlc) and u00(bmlp)  u00(bmlc).14 In other words, the optimal subsidies on
labor supplies for the poor are smaller than the rst-best levels. This is quite intuitive.
Recall that poor families face a tax on their bequest, which mitigates the negative
impact bequests have on labor supply. Because of the bequest tax, an increase in the
childs labor income induces a smaller reduction in net bequests than in the absence
of (bequest) taxation. Put di¤erently, it alleviates the lazy rotten kid phenomenon.
Consequently, labor supplies need to be subsidized at a lower rate to reach the rst-best
tradeo¤.
Let us consider the marginal rate of substitution for informal care provision which
can be written as
v0(`i + ai)
u0(mic)
=
h
i + ij   ji u
0(mjic )
u0(mic)
i
h0(ai)
i + ij   ji
+
q0(ai)
u0(mic)
= h0(ai) +
q0(ai)
u0(mic)
8 i:
As for labor supply, the tradeo¤ for informal care provision in the second-best is the
same as in the rst-best. But, again this does not imply zero marginal tax rates. From
equation (50), we get
T ia +
@bi
@ai
= T ia +
(1 Dib)u00(mip)h0(ai)  u00(mic)T ia
u00(mic) + (1 Dib)u00(mip)
= h0(ai) +
q0(ai)
u0(mic)
8 i: (63)
14This result makes use of our assumption that u000  0.
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Informal care provision in the laissez-faire is ine¢ ciently low and to achieve the rst-
best tradeo¤, it must be subsidized at the margin (see Proposition 2). Solving equation
(63) for T ia yields
T ia =
u00(mic)
(1 Dib)u00(mip)
h0(ai) +
"
u00(mic)
(1 Dib)u00(mip)
+ 1
#
q0(ai)
u0(mic)
> 0 8 i:
Since rich families face no distortion on bequests, the subsidy on aid is again the rst-
best one,
T ha = h
0(ah) + 2
q0(ah)
u0(mhc )
:
Poor families, by contrast, face a distortion on their bequests (Dlb > 0) and to achieve
the rst-best tradeo¤ for informal care, their subsidy on aid is lower. The reason behind
this result is that the child equalizes the return of labor with the return of aid. Since
the poors labor supply is already subsidized at a lower than rst-best rate, informal
care must also be subsidized at a lower rate to obtain the rst-best tradeo¤ for both
variables.
7.2.4 Private insurance and lump-sum transfers
We now turn to private insurance and public LTC benets. Before worrying about a
possible taxation or subsidization of private insurance, we have to examine whether it
is used at all in the second-best. To study this we use the FOCs given in Appendix C.
Substituting equations (84) and (85) into equation (78) yields
@L
@Ii
=(1  p) jiu0(mjip ) + i  (1  )p jiu0(bmjip ) + i
  ji

(1  p)u0(mjip )  (1  )pu0(bmjip ) = (1  p)  (1  )p  0: (64)
That is, when private insurance is o¤ered at higher than fair rates ( < p), it is not used
in the second-best solution implying Ii = 0 for i = l; h. In other words, private insurance
is dominated by public insurance provided through transfers and taxes Di and bDi.
With our nonlinear tax scheme, there is no cost of public funds(or deadweight loss)
so that the public sector can always o¤er full insurance at fair rates. As we shall now
show, this is not necessarily the optimal policy, but the argument shows that private
insurance is a dominated instrument, unless it is fair ( = p) in which case it does no
harm but cannot perform better than public coverage either.
Lets turn our attention to the optimal lump-sum transfers which provide insurance
and redistribute from high- to low-wealth families. Note that D can also be interpreted
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as public LTC provision. Rearranging and combining the FOCs with respect to Di andbDi, we obtain
u0(bmip)
u0(mip)
=
i + ij   ji u
0(mjip )
u0(mip)

1  u0(bmjip )
u0(mjip )

i + ij
8 i:
Since lh = 0 rich families are fully insured implying u0(bmhp) = u0(mhp). For poor
families, we have hl > 0 and u0(mhlp )=u0(mlp) < 1. However, we can not determine
whether the expression in brackets is smaller or larger than one, so we can have both
more or less than full insurance for low-wealth families. To the extent that Di and bDi
redistribute and provide insurance, they can be replaced in part by private insurance if
that one is available at fair rates. In that case, insurance demand I for the poor must
be taxed or subsidized to achieve the appropriate degree of under- or overinsurance.
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 When parents di¤er in wealth !i (with i = l; h) which is as opposed
to all other variables unobservable to the government, the optimal second-best policy
is characterized by:
(i) no distortion of bequests and a zero marginal tax rate for rich families. A down-
ward distortion of bequests and a positive marginal tax rate for poor families.
(ii) the rst-best tradeo¤ for labor supply and informal care which, however, does
not translate into zero marginal taxes. Specically,
a) for rich families we have T h` = bT hb` = 1 and
T ha = h
0(ah) + 2
q0(ah)
u0(mhc )
;
which are the same tax rates as in the rst-best implementation;
b) for poor families the subsidies on labor supplies and on informal care are
smaller than the rst-best levels. This is necessary to reestablish a rst-best tradeo¤ in
the presence of distortions on bequests.
(iii) full public LTC insurance for rich families and less or more than full insur-
ance for poor families. Private insurance is not necessary to implement the second-best
allocation. It can be used in equilibrium only if it is fair.
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8 Summary and conclusion
This paper has studied family aid and the demand for LTC in a model of family de-
cision making which is based on Beckers (1974; 1991) rotten kid specication. This
setting represents in a sense a worst case scenario concerning the harmonyof family
relations. In particular, children are purely selsh and neither side can make credible
commitments. In Beckers world, with a single good, this setting yields nevertheless an
e¢ cient outcome. In our more complex setting the rotten kids mechanism continues to
be at work and ensures that a positive level of aid is provided as long as the bequest
motive is operative. In other words, even when children are completely selsh and when
parents have no way to credibly commit to a bequest rule (which might for instance
punishmisbehaving children) some aid is provided, but at a level that is likely to be
too low. We have analyzed the laissez-faire which is represented by a multi-stage (non-
cooperative) aid for bequestgame and we assessed potential sources of ine¢ ciencies
by comparing the equilibrium with the e¢ cient solution. Then, we have examined the
design of LTC policies under various informational assumption and with both identical
and heterogenous individuals. Concerning the latter, we have focused on di¤erences in
parents wealth which introduces a dimension of redistribution in policy design. Spe-
cically, some individuals may be too poor to a¤ord the LTC services they need (or buy
the appropriate insurance even when it is fair). Interestingly, these individuals are then
subject to a double jeopardy; since their resources are depleted in case of dependency,
they cannot a¤ord to leave a bequest and accordingly will not receive any aid from their
children either. The case for public intervention is then quite strong.
We have obtained a number of specic results characterizing the tax treatment of
the relevant variables depending on the informational context. For instance, under full
information both aid and labor supply had to be subsidized (the latter to compensate
for the implicit tax imposed through the adjustment of bequests). However, when
aid was not observable it might be desirable to tax (market) labor as this introduces
an implicit subsidy on aid. When parents di¤er in (unobservable) wealth the optimal
policy has been shown to involve a taxation of bequests for some individuals but the
tradeo¤ between labor and aid was left undistorted.
Beyond these specic ndings the major lesson that has emerged is that crowding
out of aid either by private insurance, or by a public LTC benet or insurance scheme
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is not a problem in this setting. In families where the bequest motive is operative, aid
is una¤ected by public benets. More surprisingly still, when the bequest motive is
(originally) not operative (so that no aid is provided), public benets may even lead to
a positive level of aid. In these cases public benets (or private insurance) and family
benets are actually complements (and no substitutes). Since crowding out of family
aid is one of the major concerns in the LTC debate this property has important policy
implications. We can obviously not claim that all families interact in the way described
in our model. In reality aid is no doubt provided for a wide variety of motives. Children
may be altruistic and parents may have a wider variety of instruments (involving some
form of commitment) to induce their children to provide aid. Still pure selshness (or
something that closely resembles it) is certainly also at work in many circumstances.
Policy design should then be studied in a setting where di¤erent types of family exchange
patterns coexist. Our analysis is an important building block in such an all encompassing
model the development of which represents a formidable challenge.15 This is even more
so as the optimal policy is then not just a combination of the policies to be adopted under
each individual pattern of family relations. Since the degree of intra-family altruism is
likely to be private information, the LTC policy may somehow attempt to screen for
this unobservable information. For instance, altruistic and non altruistic families are
likely to be a¤ected in di¤erent ways by the quality of public LTC provision. With these
di¤erential preferences, quality of care may be an e¤ective screening devise, not just for
wealth but also for the degree of altruism.
Finally, the prevalence of altruism or selshness in family relations is of course to a
large extent an empirical question. From that perspective our analysis is useful in that
it points to the signicance of crowding out as an indicator of the (very loosely speaking)
degree of harmonyin family relations. Such an avenue has been pursued for instance
by Bolin et al. (2008) who argue that their results suggest that in regions with strong
family ties, i.e. southern Europe, informal care to a greater extent substitutes for formal
home care. Our model not only provides the micro foundations to such claims but it
also shows that determining the averagelevel of crowding out and (thus altruism) in
any given country is only of limited help for policy design. Since di¤erent patterns of
15Ponthière (2013) takes a steph in that direction by considering a setting in which altruistinc and
non-altruistic families coexist. In his setting the degree of altruism is not exogenous but follows a
socialization process à la Bisin and Verdier (2001). He shows that whether crowding out arises or not
depends on individual preferences and on the socialization mechanism at work.
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family relations are likely to exist within any given country (though maybe in di¤erent
country specic proportions) it would be useful to look at crowding out and altruism on
a more disaggregate level. Since many data are available on a micro-level we trust that
this path could be explored and would represent a useful complement to our analysis.16
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
To determine the levels of the di¤erent instruments we have to revisit the di¤erent stages
of the game.
A.1 Stage 3
The optimal bequest in each state of nature is now determined by maximization of
maxbb cWp =u(!   pI  bb  bD) + u((1 + by)wb`+bb)  v(b`);
max
b
Wp =u(! + (1  p)I   L+ h(a) +D   b) + q(a)
+ u((1 + y)w`+ b+ aa)  v(`+ a):
The FOCs (8)(9) continue to apply. Consequently, as long as there is an interior
solution for b and bb we will automatically have
mp = mc and bmp = bmc: (65)
However, the comparative statics change since now we have bb  bb(I; b`;by; bD) and
b  b(I; `; a; y; a; D)
@b
@a
=
h0(a)  a
2
;
@b
@`
=  w(1 + y)
2
;
@bb
@ b` =  w(1 + by)2 : (66)
A.2 Stage 2
The child solves
maxb` bUc =u(1 + by)wb`+bb  v b` (67)
max
`;a
Uc =u ((1 + y)w`+ b
 + aa)  v (`+ a) : (68)
16An alternative empirical strategy to assess the motivation of family aid is used by Norton et
al. (2013). Using data from the 1999 and 2003 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Ma-
ture Women they show that there is signicant evidence that caregives are e¤ectively paid through
inter vivos transfers.
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The FOCs with respect to b`, ` and a amount to
@ bUc
@ b` = u0(bmc)
 
w(1 + by) + @bb
@ b`
!
  v0(b`) = 0 (69)
@Uc
@`
= u0(mc)

w(1 + y) +
@b
@`

  v0(`+ a) = 0 (70)
@Uc
@a
= u0(mc)

@b
@a
+ a

  v0(`+ a) = 0: (71)
Comparing (69) and (70) to the corresponding st-best conditions (3) and (4) shows
that the rst-best can be decentralized with y = by = 1, which establishes (29).
Turning to the subsidy on aid, combining (71) with the rst-best allocations (5) and
(4) shows that a must be chosen such that
u0(mc)

@b
@a
+ a

= u0(mfbc )h
0(afb) + q0(afb) , a = h0(afb) + 2 q
0(afb)
u0(mfbc )
;
which establishes (30).
We are now also in a position to determine the levels of D and bD. Transfers must
be designed so that mp +mc = bmp + bmc, which along with the third stage equilibrium
condition (65) implies mp = mc = bmp = bmc and thus (2). This requires
!   L+ h(a) +D + (1 + y)w`+ aa = !   bD + (1 + by)wb`: (72)
In addition, the budget constraint requires
[D + yw`+ aa] + (1  )bywb`= (1  ) bD; (73)
where `, b` and a are set at the FB level (but superscripts are dropped at this stage to
simplify notation). The budget constraint can be rewritten as
bD = 
1   [D + yw`+ aa] + bywb`: (74)
Substituting into (72) and rearranging successively yields
D =(1  )
n
L+ (1 + by)wb`  [(1 + y)w`+ h(a) + aa]o
  [yw`+ aa]  (1  )bywb`: (75)
Rearranging (75) and using (74) then establishes (31) and (32).
Finally, note that this solution implies full insurance, it is plain that no additional
private insurance will be bought.
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B Proof of Proposition 3
Making use of equation (21) (which coincides with @`=@D for p = 0) and (22) (which
coincides with @ b`=@ bD for p = 1), equations (36) and (37) reduce to
u0(bmp)
u0(mp)
=
0@1  @b@` @`@D
1 + @
bb
@ b` @ b`@ bD
1A0@1 + tw @ b`@ bD
1  tw @`@D
1A , u0(bmp) = u0(mp);
which establishes (i).
To establish (ii) rst multiply (36) by w` and (37) by  wb` to obtain
u0(mp)

w`   w`@b

@`
@`
@D

  

w`   tw2`@`

@D

= 0; (76)
u0(bmp) wb` + wb`@bb
@ b` @ b`

@ bD
!
  
 
wb` + tw2 b`@ b`
@ bD
!
= 0: (77)
Adding (76) and (34), and (77) and (35) and simplifying by using (38) and (39) yields
u0(mp)

h0(a)  @b

@a

+ q0(a)

@a
@t
 

u0(mp)
@b
@`
@`c
@t

+ tw
@`c
@t
= 0;
 
"
u0(bmp)@bb
@ b` @ b`
c
@t
#
+ tw
@ b`c
@t
= 0:
Noting that @bb=@ b` =  (1  t)w=2 and rearranging yields (40) and (41).
C Second-best: rst-order conditions
Denoting L the Langrangean function of this problem, the FOCs are given by
@L
@Ii
=(i + ij)

(1  p)u0(mip)  (1  )pu0(bmip)
  ji

(1  p)u0(mjip )  (1  )pu0(bmjip )  0; (78)
@L
@bi
=(i + ij)

u0(mic)  u0(mip)
  ji u0(mjic )  u0(mjip ) = 0; (79)
@L
@ai
=(i + ij)

u0(mip)h
0(ai) + q0(ai)  v0(`i + ai)

  ji

u0(mjip )h
0(ai) + q0(ai)  v0(`i + ai)

= 0; (80)
@L
@`i
=(i + ij)

u0(mic)w   v0(`i + ai)
  ji u0(mjic )w   v0(`i + ai) = 0; (81)
@L
@bbi =(i + ij) u0(bmic)  u0(bmip)  ji u0(bmjic )  u0(bmjip ) = 0; (82)
@L
@ b`i =(i + ij)
h
u0(bmic)w   v0(b`i)i  ji hu0(bmjic )w   v0(b`i)i = 0: (83)
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@L
@Di
=(i + ij)u
0(mip)  jiu0(mjip )  i = 0; (84)
@L
@ bDi =(i + ij)u0(bmip)  jiu0(bmjip )  i = 0; (85)
@L
@Ti
=(i + ij)u
0(mic)  jiu0(mjic )  i = 0; (86)
@L
@ bTi =(i + ij)u0(bmic)  jiu0(bmjic )  i = 0: (87)
Combining equations (84) and (86), and equations (85) and (87) yields the rst-order
conditions for the optimal bequests; equations (79) and (82). In other words, as long as
bequests are interior, we do not need transfers between children on top of the transfers
between parents. That is, we can set either Ti = bTi = 0, or Di = bDi = 0.
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